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Abstract -- Meaningful public participation has been 
perceived as difficult to accommodate in regulatory 
proceedings requiring technical scientific judgments, 
especially those involving quantitative risk assessments. 
Quantitative risk assessment, however, is not a purely 
technical exercise, but instead involves the application of 
policy preferences in the form of assumptions, extrapolation 
from animal data to humans and high to low doses, 
management of incomplete data sets, and resolution of 
scientific uncertainties. Such junctures at which policy 
preferences are applied are opportunities to reflect social 
value choices that are not wholly "scientific." Those 
opportunities should be explicitly identified as such by the 
regulator. These considerations argue for a "soft" form of 
risk assessment that expressly takes societal values into 
account. Non-adversarial, consensus-based mechanisms of 
public participation that encourage greater dialogue and 
interaction among interested parties and with the regulator 
may enhance the potential for non-scientific social values 
effectively to be accommodated in regulatory proceedings 
with a heavy technical component. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An underappreciated "sleeper" issue in the regulatory 
reform debate has been the role of public participation. 
While the issue of meaningful public input into highly 
technical regulatory decisions has been recognized for some 
time, the heavy emphasis on risk assessment in recent 
regulatory reform proposals [1-4] sharpens this debate far 
more acutely than in the past. Accordingly, this paper first 
discusses the utility of quantitative risk assessment 
methodologies from a scientific point of view. The 
application in quantitative risk assessment of policy 
preferences is then identified in such areas as dealing with 
scientific uncertainty, managing incomplete data sets, 
extrapolating from animal data to human beings, and 
extrapolating from high to low doses. After observing that 
the implicit inclusion of policy preferences in quantitative risk 
assessments is consequently inevitable, the paper then 
examines the implications of that conclusion for public 
participation in regulatory proceedings involving complex 
scientific judgments. 
11. LIMITATIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
One of the touchstones of the regulatory reform debate has 
been an emphasis on "sound science." As applied, this 
stress on scientifically-based decision-making has translated 
into a heavy reliance on quantitative risk assessment [5]. In 
particular, proposals for legislative action that have recently 
been considered have utilized quantitative risk assessment and 
comparative risk assessment as screening tools, or 
preconditions to regulation -- a "gatekeeping " function. This 
intense focus on quantitative risk assessment as a rigorous 
condition precedent to regulation invites an inquiry into the 
extent to which quantitative risk assessment is strictly value- 
neutral and objectively "scientific. " 
The quantification of risks as a regulatory policy tool 
received significant impetus from the National Academy of 
Sciences's "Red Book" [6],  published in 1983. The Red 
Book endorsed a bifurcation of the regulatory process into 
two phases: "risk assessment, " which in principle establishes 
the strictly scientific basis for regulatory action; and "risk 
management," which is the multidisciplinary process of 
choosing regulatory measures. As described by the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
at the time, 
[rlisk assessment is an exercise that combines available 
data on a substance's potency in causing adverse health 
effects with information about likely human exposure, 
and through the use of plausible assumptions, it generates 
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an estimate of human health risk. Risk management is 
the process by which a protective agency decides what 
action to take in the face of such estimates. Ideally the 
action is based on such factors as the goals of public 
health and environmental protection, relevant legislation, 
legal precedent, and application of social, economic, and 
political values [7]. 
In this two stage methodology, scientific questions can 
supposedly be isolated and addressed in an objective matter 
through risk assessment methodologies at the beginning of the 
regulatory process. Pure policy choices are supposedly 
confined to the second place, risk management. At this 
stage, science may be relevant for such tasks as evaluating 
technical options. Risk manag,ement decisions, however, also 
engage other considerations, most notably social values. 
Risk assessment is a tool fo'r analyzing empirical data in a 
manner useful for crafting regulatory policy. Those data may 
be produced by epidemiological studies that survey exposed 
human populations. However, in most cases toxicological 
tests on laboratory animals are the only source of relevant 
data. This empirical information, whatever its source, must 
then be extrapolated to actual environmental settings, which 
may be very different from those under which the data were 
collected. For instance, animal tests are ordinarily conducted 
at high doses and over a short period by comparison with the 
levels to which human beings typically experience long-term 
exposure to environmental toxins. These inferences, while 
necessary because of limitations on data gathering in both 
humans and animals, inevitably introduce uncertainty into any 
risk assessment. Additionally, this extrapolation necessarily 
requires inferences, choices, and assumptions that themselves 
reflect policy preferences, an area sometimes known as 
"science policy" [6, 81. 
The inherent limitations in the utility of the quantitative risk 
assessment methodology are multiplied when applied to 
"comparative risk assessment, " in which multiple risk 
assessments are compared. Risk estimates reduced to a single 
number, even one modulated by a quantified range of 
uncertainty, often cannot be compared. For one, the metrics 
for comparison may diverge on such issues as whether risks 
are summed over a lifetime of exposure. For example, the 
frequently quoted risk of one in nine of developing breast 
cancer refers to the likelihood that a woman will contract the 
illness at some time over her entire lifespan. Second, 
synergistic effects may not be reflected in a risk assessment 
for a single substance. The nature of the risks from various 
substances themselves often camot be equated. For instance, 
the likelihood of non-cancer neurological effects in children 
from low-level lead exposure are relatively certain, 
nondichotomous, and directly correlated to the level of 
exposure. By contrast, risk estimates of carcinogenicity 
embody much more of a probabilistic concept, addressed to 
the likelihood of effects in the relatively distant future and not 
to the severity of the illness. 
Serious data gaps for even the most highly suspect bad 
actors can seriously affect the confidence level of individual 
risks assessments and undermine their "comparability. " 
Reducing an incomplete data set to a single number does not 
necessarily generate any additional insight into the effects of 
the substance involved. Indeed, such an approach may well 
mask significant underlying uncertainties. For precisely this 
reason, policy -makers have been discouraged from precisely 
defining "point estimates" of risk, and instead encouraged to 
offer a range of risks commensurate with the integrity of the 
underlying data set. As an influential publication of the 
National Academy of Sciences recently observed, "risk 
ranking under uncertainty is a complicated an error-prone 
process, regardless of whether conservative, average, or other 
point estimates are used to summarize each risk" [9]. 
Although at first blush comparative risk assessment may be 
appealing in a somewhat milder form for establishing 
regulatory priorities, as has often been proposed, such an 
approach if anything raises even more profound questions. 
Establishing regulatory priorities inevitably and necessarily 
engages issues that in a single regulatory proceeding might be 
considered within the domain of "risk management:" the 
involuntary or voluntary character of exposure to the risk; the 
extent to which the risk is concentrated in particular 
populations; the potential for catastrophic harm even if the 
long-term, chronic risk is low; the availability of 
technological options to reduce or eliminate the risk; the 
necessity for collective or governmental action as opposed to 
individual responses; the kind and degree of collective action 
required -- e.g., labelling as opposed to an outright ban; the 
extent to which the costs of regulation may be unevenly 
distributed; the administrative resources likely to be required 
to reduce or eliminate risks; and the political acceptability of 
likely public policy responses. 
111. SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
Much of the public debate over comparative risk assessment 
has been driven by allegations of the incoherence of existing 
regulation. Many of these accounts are anecdotal in nature, 
are questionably motivated, and do not necessarily withstand 
close scrutiny [lo, 111. Consequently, the scope of the 
"problem" is far from clear. 
Nonetheless, there is a widespread perception of the need 
for alternative, scientifically-based decision-making tools, and 
especially those that can be used to establish a hierarchy of 
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priorities. The apparent power of the comparative risk 
assessment methodology from this perspective is undeniable. 
Against this background, many of the admonitions about the 
scientific limitations of comparative risk assessment have 
been ignored rather than heeded by enthusiastic supporters of 
the approach. Quantitative risk assessment and comparative 
risk assessment are increasingly utilized by regulatory 
agencies even as the methodologies are being elaborated. 
While methodological limitations need to be kept firmly in 
mind, suggestions for incremental improvement, as opposed 
to wholesale abandonment, are also needed. 
A. Quantitative Risk Assessment 
As discussed above, the utility of quantitative risk 
assessment from a scientific perspective -- as "sound science" 
-- is limited by uncertainty, incomplete data sets, the need for 
assumptions, extrapolation from animal data to human beings, 
extrapolation from high to low doses, and the like. 
Addressing these challenges is not a strictly scientific or 
technical issue, but instead reflects often unstated embedded 
policy preferences. As reinforced by the title of a recent 
influential publication [9], crafting a risk assessment involves 
not only science, but also the exercise of judgment at 
numerous decision-making points. If quantitative risk 
assessment is therefore less than completely value-neutral and 
objective, then there is a role for societal values even in this 
compartmentalized, scientific aspect of regulatory decision- 
making. 
Many, if not all, of the junctures at which scientific 
judgment is required also necessarily engage social value 
choices, which not only can, but of necessity must, intrude 
into the supposedly purely scientific exercise of risk 
assessment. For example, the protracted debate over the use 
of "conservative" assumptions in risk assessments is, at least 
in part, an extended dialogue over social values. Similarly, 
the "precautionary principle, "*which counsels governmental 
authorities to err as a matter of public policy on the side of 
environmental protection in formulating public policy in 
contexts characterized by conditions of scientific uncertainty, 
may very well find application not only in risk management 
decisions but also in quantitative risk assessment. Indeed, in 
Europe there is a lively debate over whether precautionary 
approaches are, or should be, firmly grounded in science or 
should transcend scientific considerations, 
There is no accepted quantitative methodology that 
prescribes those scientific inferences or regulatory outcomes 
that are appropriate under the conditions of incomplete or 
unavailable information that characterize many quantitative 
risk assessments. Indeed, it is very likely impossible to 
imagine a numerical calculus for anticipating the wholly 
unexpected or predicting the unpredictable, which could range 
from a minor deviation in expected outcome to a catastrophic 
event. Instead, the realm of scientific uncertainty requires the 
exercise of judgement and discretion from the perspectives of 
both science and public policy. 
Attempting to deal with questions of scientific uncertainty 
through the exercise of judgment that is portrayed as purely 
"scientific" compounds perceived problems of accountability. 
By contrast, reconciling scientific uncertainties through 
approaches that take into account not only scientific 
considerations, but also social value choices, can be expected 
to enhance perceptions of legitimacy. Precautionary 
approaches, which do precisely that, have been criticized on 
occasion as a vehicle for rejecting science. Properly 
understood, however, an appropriate precautionary principle 
articulates a social preference against which uncertain science 
should be interpreted in a policy setting. 
B. Comparative Risk Assessment 
The role of social value choices in the ostensibly 
"scientific" process of risk assessment is particularly 
pronounced in the application of comparative risk assessment 
methodologies. As discussed in section I1 above, the 
endpoint of such exercises is a decision to consider risk- 
reduction measures in one area and not others, or a risk- 
based ranking that anticipates such a choice as part of a larger 
regulatory agenda. 
An example chosen by Justice Stephen Breyer in his recent, 
influential bookBreaking the Vicious Circle [ 121 demonstrates 
why this sort of sorting or ordering cannot be purely 
scientific, or even strictly risk-based no matter how broadly 
that term is construed. Breyer invites his reader, presumably 
an American citizen, to compare how governmental resources 
devoted to an overly zealous toxic waste cleanup in New 
Hampshire might be redirected to combat deforestation in 
Madagascar. Although Breyer suggests that the loss of forest 
cover on another continent is a compelling problem by 
comparison, there is no guarantee that the U.S. government's 
resources will have the slightest impact there. U.S. 
government officials may have little influence with those of 
a foreign state, which may, in turn, have its own priorities 
that do not include saving trees. Or, despite its best 
intentions, a foreign government may have little capacity to 
influence the behavior of those within its territory that are 
responsible for forest destruction. Under these 
circumstances, the United States as a society might devote 
significant governmental resources to a problem judged by 
experts or the public or both as immensely important with 
little or nothing to show for the effort. 
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More generally, public health and environmental objectives 
must be coherent with other social policies in order to be 
efficacious. If not, those aims will not be perceived as 
legitimate and the policy goals will remain unrealized. Public 
health and environmental protection initiatives consequently 
must mesh with the public's notions of the appropriate role of 
governmental action, or lack: thereof, in fostering greater 
equity, economic advancement, and social justice. For 
example, the health costs of smoking or firearms accidents 
could be substantially reduced through outright prohibition on 
the manufacture and sale of cigarettes or handguns. 
Similarly, exposures to lead could be further reduced by 
banning most remaining uses of the metal, but a relatively 
explicit public policy comprcnnise to protect U.S. industry 
and job opportunities implies other approaches to lead risk 
reduction. 
The reason that such propclsals are controversial, at least 
among the American public today, is that the other costs of 
those actions are perceived as highly detrimental to widely- 
held notions of public order and the appropriate role of 
governmental action. At least since Prohibition, outright bans 
of this sort have not frequently been advocated by even the 
most zealous public health chmnpions. Prohibition itself is 
widely regarded as a failed effort to reduce the risks from 
alcohol consumption not because a ban on alcohol production 
and consumption was ineffective in achieving the public 
health goal, but because the public policy strategy employed 
diverged from underlying expectations and values in 
American society. 
By contrast, genuine and me:aningful public participation in 
bureaucratic decision-making , particularly those that are 
carried out by unelected officials in settings like 
administrative rulemakings, facilitates accountability to the 
public and the regulated conomunity, informed choices by 
public authorities, and governmental efficiency [13-191. In 
a highly technical setting, public participation is hence a 
strategic vehicle for enhancing the credibility of the regulator 
and the efficacy of its actions. 
IV. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION I
RISK-BASED DBCISION-MAKING 
Much of the debate over risk-based regulatory reform has 
focussed on substantive regulatory outcomes. Considerably 
less attention has been devoted to the potential for the use of 
risk assessment as a screening or "gatekeeping " function to 
attenuate the legitimacy of regulatory actions. The emphasis 
on risk assessment and "sound science" in much of the 
current debate over regulatory reform increases the stakes 
dramatically from the point of view of bureaucratic 
accountability to a technically inexpert public. 
A. Articulating Values in a Scientific Setting 
Many critiques lament the lack of access by a technically 
inexpert public to decision-making processes with a high 
scientific component. The usual conclusion is a need for 
greater public education to assist a lay citizenry in providing 
more meaningful input. But to the extent that public debates 
can and should incorporate societal policy preferences, such 
as "solution" is only partially helpful. In particular, such a 
perspective inappropriately suggests that technical expertise 
is a necessary precondition to meaningful participation. If the 
art of risk assessment implicitly relies on hidden policy 
choices, as it does, then even technically "inexpert" or 
putatively "uninformed" inputs from the public can and 
should be accommodated through the process of public 
participation. 
As discussed in sections I1 and I11 above, quantitative risk 
assessment is not, strictly speaking, objectively "scientific" 
and value-neutral. Risk assessments reflect policy choices 
implicitly but inherently embedded in those analyses. 
Consequently, there is an appropriate role even in the 
supposedly scientific process of risk assessment for social 
values as expressed in policy preferences. This suggests a 
two-fold, considerably stronger conclusion that is much more 
consistent with accepted notions of democratic government 
and accountability: First, the public's role in a scientifically 
sophisticated regulatory setting is precisely to articulate non- 
scientific, non-quantifiable values, which should not and 
cannot be artificially compartmentalized in the risk 
management phase. Second, risk assessments and, 
particularly, comparative risk assessments not only can, but 
should, acknowledge these social value choices. In other 
words, it is not just appropriate but necessary that even the 
most highly technocratic decisions made by government take 
into account the preferences and priorities of the public. 
The accommodation of social value choices in risk 
assessments requires not only a reevaluation of public 
participation in regulatory decision-making , but also a 
redefinition of the purpose of technocratically expert decision- 
making in the first place. Risk assessment must respond to, 
and operate within the confines of, public preferences and 
priorities. Self-consciously and expressly reflecting policy 
preferences at appropriate junctures in a risk assessment is 
entirely consistent with the methodology. This suggests that 
the more appropriate way to view risk assessment is not as a 
scientifically rigorous endeavor, but instead to adopt what is 
sometimes called a "soft" approach that proceeds from 
the premise that risk is multidimensional and represents 
the confluence of a variety of public values and attitudes. 
A soft ranking of risks, therefore, would tend to be more 
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impressionistic than formulaic; it might use the number 
of fatalities as a rough starting point, but would modify 
the ranking by folding in various factors, such as the 
qualities of dread, mistrust, and uncertainty associated 
with each risk, the equity (or lack thereof) in how each 
risk is borne by various individuals and subpopulations, 
and the perceived benefits the risk substance or activity 
confers. According to the proponents of the soft version, 
the only way to incorporate such factors, and enhance the 
legitimacy of the resulting priorities or risk rankings, is 
to give the public equal stature with the experts from 
early stages of the analysis 11201. 
This insight in turn has important ramifications for the 
nature of regulatory processes involving technically complex 
considerations. It is unrealistic to view the purpose of such 
undertakings to be the determination of the "right" answer 
when there is no single scientifically valid outcome that exists 
apart from social value preferences. As one commentator has 
noted: 
The job of the public administrator is not merely to make 
decisions on the public's behalf, but to help the public 
deliberate over the decisions that need to be made. 
Rather than view debate and controversy as managerial 
failures that make policymaking and implementation more 
difficult, the public administrator should see them as 
natural and desirable aspects of the formation of public 
values, contributing to society's self-understanding [ 141. 
B. Consensus Models of Participation 
in a Scientific Setting 
As one observer has documented, "[flew terms in our 
contemporary political lexicon have been used with so little 
semantic precision" as public participation [13]. While the 
precise content of the concept may not be entirely clear, so- 
called "notice-and-comment" or "informal" rulemaking is 
probably the most familiar example. Requirements at the 
federal level for public notice of proposed regulations, an 
opportunity for public comment on those proposals, and the 
necessity for agency response to public comments are 
intended to assure the responsiveness and efficacy of 
bureaucratic initiatives. Although ordinarily not required, 
federal agencies may also hold oral hearings at which citizens 
may testify. It is also critically important to bear in mind 
that public participation does not ultimately shift authority and 
control over the ultimate decision from a public authority: 
The goal of public participation . . . is not to transfer the 
actual decision-making power over the formulation and 
adoption of rules to the interested public, but only to 
assure an adequate opportunity for interested persons to 
communicate their views and information to the 
appropriate . . . officials [16]. 
To the extent that risk assessment is less than rigorously 
scientific and value-neutral, it might appear that there is no 
reason why existing mechanisms for public participation 
cannot be used as vehicles to articulate public preferences. 
That said, there is no denying that regulatory issues that 
require scientific expertise are different. The particular 
inadequacies of existing avenues for providing input from a 
lay public in situations involving highly scientific or 
technocratic issues has been extensively documented [13, 141. 
Despite the appellation "informal, " notice-and-comment 
rulemakings even under the best of circumstances are 
frequently very rigidly structured often afford members of the 
public little real opportunity to influence the outcome of 
administrative decision-making processes. Those deficiencies 
may be magnified many times over in situations requiring 
extensive scientific expertise. As highly technocratic 
decision-making processes require more technical capabilities, 
there is a need for technically-skilled intermediaries, such as 
so-called "public interest groups, " to represent broader public 
concerns. Rather than altering the fundamental dynamics of 
interest group interactions, "the increasing involvement of 
technical experts in policy disputes has politicized expertise" 
[13]. The simple fact is that the outcome of a risk 
assessment is of critical importance because that result 
inevitably tends to drive the remainder of the policy process. 
The motivation for bifurcating regulatory processes into 
distinct and sequential risk assessment and risk management 
phases appears to have been improving the scientific integrity 
of such proceedings by insulating scientific determinations 
from non-technical considerations. But even those questions 
that appear to be strictly scientific can give rise to significant 
debate and controversy. Adversarial, quasi-adjudicatory 
approaches to resolving scientific issues, such as the 
discredited proposal for "science courts," are now generally 
thought to be impractical. For example, a review of the 
activities of a science advisory panel on pesticides convened 
under EPA auspices concludes that "[tlhe science court mode 
of operation, in short, has severe drawbacks. In practical 
terms there is little or no chance that a science court could 
definitively settle the issues in cases of intense controversy, 
and certainly not in a timely fashion [21]. " By contrast, such 
collegial bodies as EPA's Science Advisory Board, whose 
activities are more in the nature of peer review than 
adversarial adjudication, are generally thought to have been 
more successful vehicles for resolving contentious scientific 
debates. While administrative rulemaking not have the same 
adversarial character as a "science court," neither is that 
activity collegial or consensus-based, with clear "winners" 
and "losers" often identifiable at the end. 
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If anything, the challenge of providing meaningful 
opportunities for a lay public that is not conversant with, or 
fully informed with respect to, the nuances of scientific issues 
that arise in highly technical regulatory proceedings is even 
greater. In extreme cases, only the opinions of technically 
expert professionals, even those that are purely subjective, 
may be perceived as credible. Phrased in terms of the 
excerpt quoted above, "help[ ing] the public deliberate over 
the decisions that need to be made" is doubly difficult when 
the experts seem to hold all the cards. 
Over the past decade or SID, models of agency decision- 
making that involve genuine (dialogue rather than adversarial 
jousting have begun to gain acceptance [22]. Initially, these 
consensus approaches were eimployed in settings such as so- 
called "regulatory negotiations, " where interest group 
dynamics had effectively limited the potential for agency 
action. Since then, many agencies, industry representatives, 
and members of the public have become more comfortable 
with this sort of two-way interaction as an alternative to 
unidirectional demands made through the ordinary regulatory 
process. Non-adversarial, consensus-building processes may 
very well find application in regulatory proceedings that 
involve scientific judgments concerning public health and the 
environment [23]. Such approaches can be expected both to 
educate a technically inexpert public with respect to scientific 
questions and to provide a vehicle for taking into account 
policy preferences based on social values. The time now is 
very likely ripe to extend such approaches more generally to 
overcome deficiencies in the usual administrative process in 
situations involving scientific and technical complexities that 
otherwise might be inaccessible to members of the lay public. 
One of the widely agreed benefits of consensus processes 
are enhanced efficacy and peirceptions of legitimacy, at least 
in some cases. Indeed, the two are related. Stakeholders 
that have agreed to a particular regulatory action after 
weighing all the consequence:s to their own interests are far 
less likely to challenge that alction in alternative venues such 
as the courts or the legislature. More subtly, the 
effectiveness of regulatory action in almost all cases, at least 
in a democracy such as the IJnited States, depends not only 
on the state's coercive power but also consensual 
implementation by private parties. The more the regulated 
community and the public at large have "bought into" a 
particular regulatory approach, the greater the degree of 
voluntary compliance that can be expected. On the other side 
of the ledger, the perceived accountability of consensus-based 
approaches to the public at large depends to a large extent on 
the identity of the participants. Although difficult at times, 
care must be taken in structuring such approaches to assure 
that broad-gauge public values, and not solely narrow 
interest-group dynamics, are adequately represented. 
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